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Abstract
Heterogeneity in the ethnic composition of Germany’s immigrant population ren-
ders general conclusions on the degree of economic integration di￿cult. Using a rich
longitudinal data-set, this paper tests for di￿erences in economic assimilation pro￿les
of four entry cohorts of foreign-born immigrants and ethnic Germans. The impor-
tance of time-invariant individual unobserved heterogeneity and panel attrition in
determining the speed of assimilation is analysed. We ￿nd evidence for heterogeneity
in the assimilation pro￿les and for robust assimilation pro￿les for two entry cohorts
only. Omitted variables, systematic sample attrition and the presence of second
generation immigrants in the sample in￿uence the speed of assimilation, but do not
change the overall picture.
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Since the end of the Second World War, Germany has faced a multi-cultural experience
of immigration (Bauer et al., 2005). In the period up to the1970s immigrants have been
actively recruited from Southern Europe to match increased demand for low skilled labour
in Germany’s postwar economic boom. Since the end of the guest-worker recruitment era
in 1973, the ethnic composition of immigration to Germany has changed substantially.
Today, Germany has a sizeable community of ethnic Germans who originate predomi-
nantly from Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union. This is a relatively
young group of immigrants who arrived during the late 1980s and early 1990s and who
received German citizenship upon arrival. Another large group that has arrived since
the 1990s are the politically persecuted and refugees of war. This group in itself is very
heterogeneous, including sending countries as diverse as Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey,
Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq. This
change in ethnic composition among entry cohorts implies a respectable degree of het-
erogeneity in educational backgrounds and German language capabilities. Expectation
about assimilation behaviour should di￿er for each group.
Assimilation behaviour is traditionally tested in the framework of the assimilation
hypothesis, an idea originally proposed by Chiswick (1978). It states that immigrants
su￿er an initial earnings disadvantage upon arrival vis-￿-vis comparable natives. With
years of residence, the initial earnings gap is expected to disappear. According to this
idea, immigrants experience a steeper experience-earnings pro￿le than natives, because
they invest more in country-speci￿c human capital accumulation due to lower opportu-
nity cost (Dulep and Regets, 1999). The greater the initial disadvantage, the greater the
incentive to acquire country-speci￿c knowledge and therefore the faster the assimilation
process. For the US, empirical tests of the assimilation hypothesis suggest a catch-up of
foreigners with comparable natives after 10 to 15 years (Chiswick, 1978; Carliner, 1980).
Proponents of this view argue that those immigrants that exceed the average earnings
of comparable natives are positively self-selected in terms of unobservable characteristics
1(Chiswick, 1978). The assimilation hypothesis is criticized by Borjas (1985, 1995) who
argues that the positive and signi￿cant coe￿cients on years of residence typically esti-
mated from cross-sectional data only capture a secular decline in the productivity of later
immigrant cohorts. To support his argument, Borjas (1985) uses synthetic cohorts, that is
following over time samples de￿ned by year of immigration and age. The latter approach
is however problematic in itself as it cannot capture selective migration, changes in the
composition of samples over time or disentangle longitudinal changes from period e￿ects
(Chiswick et al., 2002).
The assimilation hypothesis in the framework of cross-sectional or pooled analysis has
been the guiding analytical framework in assessing the degree of economic integration
of immigrants in Germany. The majority of empirical work tests for a concave or a
linear1 earnings assimilation pro￿le as a function of years of residence of guest-workers
assuming the assimilation pro￿le to be homogeneous across cohorts. Various studies yield,
however, di￿erent results. Bauer et al. (2005), Licht and Steiner (1994), Schmidt (1997)
and Pischke (1992) conclude that earnings of immigrants do not assimilate to those of
comparable German natives over time, despite a large initial earnings di￿erential upon
arrival. Schmidt (1993), for blue-collar workers, and Constant and Massey (2005) ￿nd
evidence for assimilation that takes place somewhere between17 to 23 years, respectively.
Initial earnings di￿erentials are explained by education (Schmidt, 1997; Constant and
Massey, 2005) or country of origin di￿erences (Schmidt, 1992), the latter being a proxy for
di￿erences in the quality of origin-country education or labour market experience gathered
in the home country. Others explain the speed of assimilation over time by proxies for
the actual investment in destination country-speci￿c human capital. Dustmann (1993,
1994) suggests that intended length of stay and language pro￿ciency are good predictors
of economic assimilation.
In total, it is unclear whether long-run assimilation processes exist and whether these
1Schmidt (1992) tests for both linear and quadratic speci￿cations. Schmidt (1994a) applies a linear
speci￿cation for explaining assimilation of ethnic Germans. Schmidt (1997) uses indicator variables for
various periods of lengths of stay in Germany. This study ￿nds no assimilation of various cohorts of
length of stay, however it does ￿nd that there are no initial earnings di￿erences between within groups
of quali￿cation and status
2di￿er across immigrant cohorts. Also, little is known about the labour market assimilation
of ethnic Germans. Two exceptions are Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) and Schmidt
(1994b) who ￿nd that ethnic Germans either do not have initial earnings disadvantages
or that they eventually reach earnings parity with German natives. Both studies, however,
use data collected before 1997. Last, we know only little about the economic position of
immigrants from other countries of origin who arrived during the1990s.
Using 21 waves of the German Socio-Economic panel, we assess the long-term eco-
nomic position in terms of earnings of immigrants vis-￿-vis German natives. Exploiting
the longitudinal nature of our data allows to control for time-invariant, individual un-
observed heterogeneity such as ability or latent health. For instance, Toussant-Comeau
(2004) stresses the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in determining occupational
upward mobility of Hispanics in the US and estimates the assimilation coe￿cient, i.e. the
parameter picking up earnings dynamics, with a random e￿ects speci￿cation. However,
a random e￿ects approach is limited to adjusting standard errors only rather than truly
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. In this case parameter estimates of upward mo-
bility are more e￿cient, but they are still biased due to omitted variable bias. A ￿xed
e￿ects speci￿cation would be more appropriate.
The size of our data enables us to test whether the results are driven by including
quasi-second generation immigrants in our sample. These are identi￿ed as immigrants who
arrived in Germany at very young age, whereas we exclude a priori all foreigners actually
born in Germany2. Age at immigration might be important since immigrants arriving at a
very young age in the host country are more likely to acquire destination country-speci￿c
human capital such as language skills and knowledge about entry requirements into local
labour markets.
In spite of a variety of advantages, the use of long panel data-sets entail some problems.
The longer the sequence of waves the more likely it is that individuals systematically drop
out of the sample. Panel attrition may bias estimation results if the probability of leaving
2Gang and Zimmermann (2000) identify second generation immigrants as those who were either born
in Germany or arrived in Germany no older than16 years of age.
3the sample, either due to non-response or migration, is systematically linked to labour
market outcomes. The empirical literature ￿nds evidence for signi￿cant selectivity in
exiting behavior, even though biases are rather small (Ayala et al., 2006; Behr, 2004;
Behr et al., 2003, 2005; Becketti et al., 1988; Crouchley et al., 2002; Hausman and Wise,
1979; Lillard and Panis, 1998; Zabel, 1998; Ziliak and Kniesner, 1998). The majority of
studies investigate attrition bias for the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) or
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). For the GSOEP, work is limited
to early waves of the data-set and does not di￿erentiate between immigrant sub-groups,
except for Schmidt (1994b, p. 121) who ￿nds that 43 percent of individuals in his sample
of guest-workers drop-out due to non-participation. Rendtel (1990, 1995) suggest that the
impact of socio-economic variables on the probability of participation disappears after the
second wave in 1985. Pannenberg (2000) and Spiess and Pannenberg (2003) demonstrate
that there is substantial attrition from the GSOEP due to refusal or moving abroad. In the
context of economic assimilation only Licht and Steiner (1994) test whether panel attrition
in the GSOEP is systematically linked to labour market outcomes of foreigners 3. On the
other hand, biased assimilation coe￿cients could also be the result of selective return-
migration, a special case of panel attrition. Typical determinants of return-migration are
duration of stay, education or labour income, and location of family in the host country
(Brecht, 1994; Constant and Massey, 2005; Velling, 1994; Schmidt, 1994a). Even though
it is impossible to identify the actual return-migration in the GSOEP, we can model the
decision to move abroad or the decision to stay in Germany. The underlying idea is that
immigrants have a greater probability to move out of Germany than German natives
and that their decision to move is highly linked with their duration of stay, income and
educational background.
As a point of departure, we test the heterogeneity of economic assimilation pro￿les
by augmenting a standard earnings equation with period of entry (cohorts) indicators.
Cohorts are distinguished on the basis of changing immigration regimes, i.e. immigrants
3This study models both the labour market participation decision and the return-migration decision
of foreigners.
4who arrived between 1955-1968, 1969-1973, 1974-1987, and 1988-2002 and ethnic Ger-
mans arriving between 1988 and 2002. To control for unobserved heterogeneity, the same
speci￿cation is re-estimated by taking di￿erences from the mean. Technically, this method
identi￿es the earnings growth rates of the cohorts over time, but no longer their initial
earnings di￿erences. Then, we model two possible sources of attrition bias. The two
probabilities of participating in the interview and staying in Germany are corrected with
a two-step Heckman sample selection model, modelling the two decision processes simul-
taneously. These estimates are used to calculate inverse Mills ratios separately for all
foreigner cohorts and German natives. The challenge of this procedure is to identify ap-
propriate exclusion restrictions for all groups. Last, we test the sensitivity of our results
with respect to the sample de￿nition by eliminating all individuals who could be de￿ned
as second generation immigrants.
We ￿nd evidence for heterogeneity in the assimilation pro￿les across cohorts for annual
earnings. The assimilation hypothesis is con￿rmed for two cohorts only. Time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity and systematic drop-out of the sample in￿uence the estimated
speed of assimilation of these two groups, but the impact is still statistically signi￿cant. A
check of robustness with respect to the sample de￿nition leaves results mainly unchanged.
The paper is organized as follows. Section2 explains the econometric framework with
particular focus on the model to control for panel attrition and the choice of exclusion
restrictions. Data issues are addressed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical
results and a checks for robustness, and in section5 we summarize the ￿ndings.
2 Econometric framework
2.1 Labour market outcomes
To compare the labour market outcome of foreigners relative to German natives we aug-
ment a standard Mincer equation of log earnings with years of residence and its square. Let
5Yit represent real annual gross earnings4 for individuals i = 1;:::;N and t = 1;:::;Ti (un-
balanced panel) and take the natural logarithm of the column vectorYi = [Yi1;:::;YiTi]0:
lnYi = ® +
X
g
Dg ¢ ¯g0 +
X
g
Dg ¢ Y oRi¯g1 +
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iÃ + ui; (1)
where from now on we consider each enlisted variable as a column vector of dimension
Ti£1 and each matrix of dimensionTi£k, k being number of variables. In Eq. (1), ‘years
of residence’ (YoRi) measures the number of years a foreigner has resided in Germany
after entry. The quadratic speci￿cation represents the assumption that log earnings are a
concave function of years of residence (Chiswick, 1978) 5. The matrix Xi includes a set of
human capital dummy variables which take the value1 if the individual holds a speci￿c
degree or vocational training, and 0 otherwise. We distinguish between ￿ve categories
for schooling degrees, i.e. ’dropout’, ’secondary schooling degree’, ’intermediate schooling
degree’, ’technical schooling degree’ and ’upper schooling degree’, and four categories
of professional training, i.e. ’no vocational training’, ’vocation training’, ’technocratic
training’, and ’university degree’. We de￿ne German natives to be the reference group
captured by the constant ®.
To allow the productivity to di￿er between immigrant cohorts (Borjas, 1985, 1995),
the coe￿cients of the intercept¯g0, years of residence ¯g1 and its square ¯g2 vary across all
four groups of ￿rst generation immigrants and ethnic Germans. The subscriptg for group
refers to Cohort 5568, Cohort 6973, Cohort 7487, Cohort 8802 and ethnic Germans. The
dummy variableDg equals one if the particular individual belongs to sub-groupg, and zero
otherwise. Years of residence and its square are interacted with each sub-group dummy.
4We use annual earnings since wages in Germany are relatively rigid. Employees have little in￿uence
on the wage determination process. Thus, wages do not necessarily re￿ect di￿erences in labour market
productivity. Lacking wage ￿exibility is particularly prevalent in the low skill sector, in which the majority
of foreigners concentrate.
5We are aware of the critique by Murphy (1990) and Yuengert (1994) who show that a quadratic
speci￿cation might not be the appropriate functional form. However, we chose the quadratic simpli￿cation
since our main interest is to investigate the various sources of bias to the conventionally tested assimilation
hypothesis by Chiswick (1978).
6The matrix Wi includes a variety of individual-speci￿c variables such as age, number of
persons living in the household, marital status, and disability status. Workplace-speci￿c
variables such as the average hours worked per week and tenure at same ￿rm are captured
by the matrix Hi. We allow for hours worked to control for part-time employees. For
immigrants, age at entry into Germany is captured byIi for the sensitivity analysis only.
All other determinants of earnings that cannot be observed are aggregated in the normally
distributed zero mean error ui. The main objects of interest in our analysis are the three
parameter vectors ¯g0, ¯g1, and ¯g2. Conditional on the speci￿cation, we impose various
restrictions on the parameter vectors µ;°;¼, and Ã.
We do not include time ￿xed e￿ects to capture business cycle variations. If included,
we would have to make the assumption that foreigners and German natives are a￿ected
equally by business cycle shocks in order to identify the parameters (Borjas, 1994). This is
the case because years of residence is a linear combination of the period e￿ect and the year
of immigration. Barth et al. (2004) have shown that equal period e￿ect restrictions can
produce biased estimates of assimilation and cohort e￿ect, if the overall macroeconomic
conditions have either a positive or negative trend. Since we use as dependent variable
real earnings, that is adjusted to the price level, we can pick up in￿ation trends.
We also refrain from including self-assessed language pro￿ciency as an explanatory
variable as proposed by Dustmann (1994) and applied by Constant and Massey (2005).
These subjective measures of language pro￿ciency are prone to misclassi￿cation error
and thus estimated coe￿cients may be severely biased (Dustmann and Van Soest, 2001).
Moreover, language pro￿ciency may be endogenous with respect to labour market earn-
ings.
In a ￿rst step, we estimate Eq. (1) by pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS), im-
posing the restriction of a zero coe￿cient (Ã = 0) on the age at entry variable. In the
pooled model we take advantage of the largest sample possible, which is particularly im-
portant given the small sample sizes of the immigrant sub-cohorts. In a second step, we
re-estimate Eq. (1) with a linear ￿xed e￿ects speci￿cation to address potential omitted
variable biases due to time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Eq. (2) results from the
7assumption uit = ®i + "it and taking di￿erences from the mean. Only parameters of
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2.2 Panel attrition
The data used are unbalanced, the sequence of nonmissing observations varies across
groups or even individuals. In this analysis we consider unit non-response only. On the
one hand, individuals may refuse to participate any longer in the interview with no par-
ticular reason given. On the other hand individuals may drop out of the sample because
they move abroad. If the underlying processes determining labour market outcomes cor-
relates with those shaping the decision to participate or moving abroad OLS estimates
are inconsistent (Heckman, 1979). For instance, assume that a disproportionately high
share of low-skilled migrants compared to German natives leaves the panel prematurely
due to language problems. If this group of low-skilled immigrants also exhibits a lower
earnings potential than the individuals staying in the panel, OLS estimates of their speed
of assimilation would be biased upward. Similar arguments hold for the decision to stay
in Germany. For instance, if high-skilled migrants exhibit a higher probability to stay in
Germany than low-skilled foreigners due to better labor market opportunities, OLS para-
meter estimates are biased upwards. If this systematic link between the two processes is
constant over time, ￿xed e￿ects estimation eliminates the bias. If not, even ￿xed e￿ects
estimation yields unreliable parameter estimates.
We address systematic panel attrition by assuming the existence of an unobserved
variable that a￿ects both the earnings equation and the attrition process. Under the
assumption ’missingness on unobservables’ (Fitzgerald et al., 1998) the bias can be alle-
viated with a Heckman sample selection model (Hausman and Wise, 1979; Verbeek and
Nijman, 1992). Regarding the participation decision, we calculate the sample selection
correction terms for German natives and ethnic Germans from a simple reduced form
8probit model. For the di￿erent cohorts of ￿rst generation immigrants we calculate the
selection correction from a bivariate probit model that links the error terms of the deci-
sion to participate in the interview and to stay in Germany. To identify the parameter
estimates in the selection model we need good and valid exclusion restrictions.
For German natives and ethnic Germans letp¤
ij be the true, but unobserved net utility
from participating in the interview:
p
¤
ij = L:Xij1¯j1 + L:Zij1°j1 + ²ij1; (3)
where j represents these two groups, L is the lag operator,L:Xij1 is a matrix of explanatory
variables lagged by one time period, ¯j1 is vector of regression coe￿cients, and ²ij1 is an
error term. The regressor matrix may coincide with all variables in Eq. (1). The vector
L:Zij1 captures the exclusion restrictions lagged by one time period and the 1 in the
subscript refers to the participation decision.
We observe the individual to participate in the interview,pij = 1,6 if the true, under-








Assume ²ij1 » N(0;1) and let (L:Xij1 + L:Zij1)0 = M0
j1, µj1 = (¯j1 °j1)0, then the proba-
bility to participate can be expressed as:
Pr(pij = 1) = ©(M
0
j1µj1):
For German natives and ethnic Germans the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) can directly be









6The codi￿cation of this variable is based on the variable ‘success of interview’. A value of1 in period
t represents "successfully conducted interview in year t".
9For the ￿rst generation sub-cohorts, we model the decision to participate and to stay in
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c representing Cohort 5568, Cohort 6973, Cohort 7487, and Cohort 8802. For the decision
to stay in Germany let s¤






c2µc2 + ²ic2; (6)
where (L:Xic2 + L:Zic2) = M0
c2 and µc2 = (¯c2 °c2)0. All variables are de￿ned as above
except forL:Zic2 being the vector of exclusion restrictions for this process and the subscript
2 refers to the decision to stay..
We observe a foreigner to stay in Germany sic = 17 if net utility from staying in
Germany s¤







Assuming ²ic2 » N(0;1) the probability to stay in Germany can be expressed as
Pr(sic = 1) = ©(Mc2µc2):
We further assume that the error terms of the two decisions are not independent from each
other (cov(²ic1²ic2) = ½c 6= 0). The IMRs for the four di￿erent cohorts of ￿rst generation
immigrants have to be calculated from a bivariate probit model in which we account
for partial observability (Poirier, 1980; Vella, 1998). The error terms of (5) and (6) are
7The proxy for staying in Germany sic = 1 if the variable "success of interview" takes the value 5.
This value represents moving out of Germany. For ethnic Germans we do not have to formalize this
decision, because we obtain only four person-year observations for this group in our sample.















where dicl = 2yicl ¡ 1;l = 1;2 and ©bp is the bivariate normal cumulative distribution
function. From this log-likelihood we obtain the bivariate probit Maximum Likelihood
estimates ^ µc1 and ^ µc2 that are used to calculate IMRs according to Vella (1998, p. 256)
for each cohort c:
^ ¸c1 = ¾c1 ¢
Á(Mc1^ µc1)©(M0
c1(^ µc2 ¡ ^ ½c ¢ ^ µc1))
©bp(Mc1^ µc1;Mc2^ µc2; ^ ½c)
; (7)
and
^ ¸c2 = ¾c2 ¢
Á(Mc2^ µc2)©(M0
c2(^ µc1 ¡ ^ ½c ¢ ^ µc2))
©bp(Mc1^ µc1;Mc2^ µc2; ^ ½c)
; (8)
The selectivity-corrected earnings equation is:
lnYi = ® +
X
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0¡c2 + ui; (9)
where g refers to all groups, j to German natives and ethnic Germans, and c to ￿rst
generation cohorts, 1 stands for the decision to participate and 2 for the decision to stay.
The parameter vectors ¡j, ¡c1 ¡c2 represent the in￿uence of the inverse Mills ratios on
earnings.
112.3 Exclusion Restrictions
A valid and good exclusion restriction, in our caseZ, has to meet the following two con-
ditions. It must not systematically correlate with the error term of the earnings equation
((i) cov(L:Z1;²1) = cov(L:Z2;²2) = 0) and it should signi￿cantly correlate with the partic-
ipation or the decision to stay equation ((ii) cov(L:Z1;p) 6= 0 and cov(L:Z2;s) 6= 0). The
￿rst assumption requires that the exclusion restrictionZ lagged by one time-period must
not correlate with the unobservables that determine the current decision to participate
in the interview or to stay in Germany. It implies that the exclusion restriction of last
period must not correlate with current labour market outcomes. Whether this assumption
holds has to be judged by economic reasoning. The second assumption requires that the
exclusion restriction correlates with the decision to participate and to stay in Germany.
It can be tested by imposing the Null-Hypothesis of H0 : °1 = °2 = 0 in Eqs. (3), (5),
and (6).
With respect to the participation decision, it is common to use ‘change of interviewer
during the ￿rst year since panel entry’ (Behr, 2004; Rendtel, 1990; Spiess and Pannenberg,
2003; Willis and Hill, 2001). The idea behind this instrument is that interviewees are more
likely to continue to participate if the interviewer remains the same over the year. Working
through the questionnaire in collaboration with the interviewer is time intensive and to
answer authentically requires trust towards the interviewer. If the interviewer changes, an
interviewee must build up a new relationship, a requirement which may cause uneasiness.
On the other hand, whether the interviewer changes does not in￿uence the labour market
performance of the interviewee, since this decision is solely taken by the data collection
agency.
With respect to the decision to stay in Germany, it is more complex to ￿nd an appropri-
ate exclusion restriction. The literature on return-migration identi￿es relative deprivation,
capital constraints, higher purchasing power in destination country or country-of-origin,
or higher rates of return to self-employment as possible explanations for returning home
(see e.g. (Dustmann, 2003)). All of these factors are, nevertheless, intimately linked to
12the labour market position of an immigrant. Constant and Massey (2005) suggest that
any variable that represents strong ties or attachment with the country of origin is a good
predictor for the probability of moving abroad. Information on where relevant family
members live, whether the family has children in schooling age, or whether the immigrant
came from a war-torn country may proxy these locational preferences. We choose indica-
tors for ‘number of children below the age 13’, ‘spouse or child(ren) away’, and ‘having
left the country of origin due to war or seeking freedom’. The idea behind the exclusion
restriction ‘number of children below the age13’ is that families who have several children
younger than 13 years of age are more likely to stay in Germany because they do not want
them to change the familiar schooling environment.
Children who undergo primary and secondary education ￿nd themselves in a decisive
period for developing intellectual and social skills. The more children of compulsory
schooling age a family has, the more likely a family will decide in favour of staying. On
the other hand, there is no empirical evidence that the actual number of children aged
under 13 years exhibits an independent impact on the labour market position of the
father8. Furthermore, a father whose child(ren) or spouse are living abroad will be more
likely to return to the country where his family lives. Whether or not a part of the family
stays abroad is more likely due to the particular immigration regime rather than due to
the labour market outcome of the father.
Finally, whether an immigrant returns to his or her country-of-origin depends also on
the motivation for migration. Immigrants who left their home countries to escape civil
war or oppression of individual liberties are less likely to leave their host country as long
as these conditions persist. On the other hand, whether or not such conditions are found
in a speci￿c country-of-origin is unlikely to be related to the labour market outcome of
the particular immigrant.
8There are some arguments in favor of an existing link between the number of children aged younger
than 13 and labour market earnings. The more children a family has, the more child bene￿ts it receives.
We use, however, gross annual earnings that exclude governmental transfers. On the other hand, the
presence of children could motivate a family father to become more ambitious in his career. We found
that the number of children in the time period before has no statistical signi￿cant association with
contemporaneous earnings.
13The former three instruments are used for the ￿rst three foreigner cohorts. In ad-
dition to these instruments, the instrument of war in country-of-origin is used for the
latest immigrant cohort. Parameter estimates for both decision processes are statistically
signi￿cant and are presented in Tables 7 and 8 in the Appendix.
3 Data
The analysis is based on 21 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) from
1984 to 2004. Our sample includes all male persons aged 18 to 60, who live in West
Germany, who are not self-employed, and who are currently not in education or vocational
training. This yields 86;510 person-year observations. German natives are identi￿ed
as being born and raised in West Germany and holding a German citizenship. Ethnic
Germans are identi￿ed as being born outside of Germany, holding a German citizenship,
originating from Eastern Europe or Russia, and arriving in Germany after1987. First
generation immigrants are identi￿ed as being born outside Germany, entering Germany
between 1955 and 2002, and holding a foreign nationality9. We further split this group
of ￿rst generation immigrants into sub-cohorts which are identi￿ed along the various
immigration regimes described in Bauer et al. (2005, p. 206-211).
We identify ￿rst generation immigrants who entered during the guest-worker recruit-
ment period between 1955 and 1973. Since empirically a much larger number of immi-
grants entered after 1968 than between 1955 and 1967 (see Fig. 1 and Schmidt (1994a,
p. 121)10) and since the last guest-worker agreement was signed in1968, we distinguish
between two groups of guest-workers. Those who entered between 1955 and 1968 are
labelled Cohort 5568 and those who entered between 1969 and 1973 are labelled Cohort
6973. We opted for this sub-division of guest-workers to allow for a hypothetical system-
atic di￿erence between the earlier and the later recruits in terms of risk attitude. The
9We disregard those immigrants who obtained the German nationality. More than1:5 percent of our
total sample, or roughly 7 percent of the foreigner population in the sample, naturalized. Controlling for
naturalization has no e￿ect on the estimation results. These can be obtained on request.
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Figure 1: In￿ow of immigrants between 1955 and 1973
earlier recruits may be interpreted as the pioneers who left their home country without so-
cial networks in Germany. The later recruits may have followed due to recommendations
from fellow countrymen, who experienced the labour market opportunities, and due to the
possibility of falling back on now existing social networks in Germany. Those immigrants
who entered during family reuni￿cation between 1974 and 1987 are classi￿ed as Cohort
7487, and those who entered shortly before the fall of the Iron Curtain are classi￿ed as
Cohort 8802. In total, we dispose of 9;977 native Germans, 297 ethnic Germans, and
2;152 ￿rst generation immigrants. For ￿rst generation immigrants we are left with487,
749, 487, and 244 individuals for cohorts 5586, 6973, 7487, and 8802, respectively.
Table 1 presents the unconditional means of key socio-economic characteristics for
all groups together with mean annual real gross labour earnings 11 (Tables 4 to 6 in the
Appendix provide de￿nitions for all variables). To account for the over-sampling of for-
eigners cross-sectional probability weights provided by the GSOEP are used. Longitudinal
weights are not used since we explicitly model panel attrition. The vast majority of the
￿rst three foreigner cohorts stems from the classical guest-worker countries ( 71 to 82 per-
cent), whereas this holds for less than 50 percent of the latest foreign immigrant cohort.
11This variable re￿ects the sum of all monthly salaries before tax deduction. It comprises bonus
payments such as holiday bonus, and the so-called13th and 14th monthly salary. We chose yearly income
rather than monthly or hourly wages, since it captures times of unemployment or underemployment and
represents the most important income concept in the German economy.
15Hence, the nationality mix changed substantially in most recent years. Annual real gross
earnings are the largest for native Germans, followed by Cohorts5568, 6973, and 8802.
Ethnic Germans and Cohort 7487 have the lowest earnings. For the former group it may
be due to their members shortest duration of stay in Germany. For the latter group it
is because its members are the youngest of all groups 12. These distributional di￿erences
are exempli￿ed in Fig. 2 for average earnings greater than4;800 Euro and smaller than
80;000 Euro p.a.. The large fraction of individuals scattered around the4800 Euro limit
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Figure 2: Probability distribution of annual earnings
The latest immigrant cohort is the group, which arrived on average at a much older
age ( 26 years) than the three previous cohorts (21;22;17 years, respectively). Cohort
7487 was on average the youngest cohort to arrive in Germany. Nearly 42 percent of
them arrived in Germany at age younger than15 years. This is probably due to the fact
that the main channel of immigration during that time was family reuni￿cation. In this
12The sample used does not include individuals with excessive real gross earnings for ethnic Germans.
There were only six individuals whose real gross earnings exceeded100;000 Euro p.a.. Except for one
individual, all hold a University degree and are older than37 years of age. We excluded three cases from
the German sample. Those were two individuals with less than12:5 years of education and aged below
23 years, who earned more than 400;000 Euro p.a. and one technocrat aged 30 years who reported to
earn more than 500;000 Euro p.a..
13Those are individuals working part-time or on the basis of tax-free income of currently440 Euro per
month. As the densities show, there is greater proportion of foreigners working in a Mini-job.
16Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Group: Age % from Age at % younger Highest No Annual
main origin immi- than 15 schooling schooling real gross
countries1 gration upon arrival degree degree earnings 2
German 38:9 ¡¡ ¡¡ ¡¡ 20:6 2:5 36;313
Ethnic Germans 36:4 91:9 27:8 15:9 4:4 5:1 24;426
Entry Cohort 55 to 68 48:5 71:8 22:0 18:6 2:2 31:2 27;509
Entry Cohort 69 to 73 44:5 81:8 21:1 26:0 2:3 24:8 26;948
Entry Cohort 74 to 87 34:0 70:8 17:0 41:9 3:0 14:3 22;701
Entry Cohort 88 to 02 34:1 47:8 25:9 7:5 4:8 9:5 24;836
Table 1 presents unconditional means of main variables of interests. 1 For ￿rst generation immigrants: Greece, Italy, Spain,
Turkey and Yugoslavia. For ethnic Germans: Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania and Russia. 2 Annual gross earnings are averaged
for annual incomes greater than 4; 800 Euro.
group the majority of its members went at least partly through the German education
system. Whether this makes any di￿erence for their relative labour market performance
remains an empirical question, which we address in our analysis. Education indicators
suggest that this group is indeed di￿erent from earlier cohorts. A much smaller proportion
of Cohort 7487 (around 14 percent) dropped out of school compared to the two oldest
cohorts (32 and 24 percent). Ethnic Germans are relatively well educated, only5 percent
￿nished school without a degree and more than 4 percent hold the highest schooling
degree. The youngest cohort of ￿rst generation immigrants is the group with the largest
proportion of highly educated among foreign immigrants. However, we also observe a
considerable share (nearly 10 percent) of its members without a schooling degree. Fig.
3(a) display the changes in income over time for all groups. Annual real gross earnings
evolve heterogeneously over time for each sub-group relative to German natives. For
instance, while earnings are growing for German natives, they are falling for nearly all
foreigner groups (except Cohort 8802) between 1994 and 2004. Thus, we cannot make
the assumption that time shocks equally a￿ect foreigners and natives.
Fig. 3(b) displays the earnings di￿erences between all foreigner sub-groups and the
German benchmark-case (horizontal line)14. Income di￿erences over time are small for
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Figure 3: Earnings over time
the ￿rst three cohorts. The youngest immigrant group, Cohort8802, and ethnic Germans
have the largest initial disadvantage, but their earnings increase the fastest over time.
Income di￿erences are statistically signi￿cant for all ￿ve sub-groups relative to native
Germans (graph not presented here)15. They remain strictly negative for Cohort 7487,
Cohort 8802 and ethnic Germans, and mainly positive for the oldest two Cohorts5568
and 6973. The latter implies that we cannot observe a concave assimilation pro￿le for
these two groups in the raw data.
Figs. 4(a) to 4(f) show the evolution of the sample size for each group over time by
professional training. Profession 1 means no professional training, profession 2 means
the individual has acquired an apprenticeship, profession 3 means the individual has
acquired a degree from a technical (three-year programme in administrative or health
sciences) school, and profession 4 means the individual has obtained a university degree.
Sample sizes change at di￿erent degrees for di￿erent professional groups and they change
di￿erently for the various sub-groups16. For all groups, sample sizes for individuals with a
university degree diminish less strongly than for individuals with no professional training.
For ethnic Germans, for instance, from1999 onwards there are more individuals who hold
a set of dummy variables representing foreigner groups for each year. The parameter estimates of this
raw method for each time period is used as data point.
15Graphs with con￿dence intervals are provided upon request.











































































































































































Figure 4: Evolution of samples over time by vocational training
19a university degree in the sample than those who have no professional training, whereas
the opposite holds in 1994. Thus, there seems to be evidence for a systematic relationship
between human capital endowment and the probability of staying in the sample.
4 Results
This section discusses the results obtained for the earnings equation. We report only
marginal e￿ects of interest to our economic hypothesis, i.e. the immigrant sub-group
speci￿c intercepts ¯g0, which represent the initial earnings di￿erential, and the parameter
vectors of years of residence ¯g1 and its square ¯g2. The latter indicate the assimilation
pro￿les of each group. The results of the uni- and bivariate probit models, from which
we calculate the inverse Mills ratios for the sample selection correction, are provided in
Tables 7 and 8 in the Appendix. Full results are provided upon request 17.
4.1 Annual earnings
Estimates for Eq. (1) are presented in Table 2. In Model1 we regress the logarithm of real
gross earnings on the sub-group indicators and the second order polynomial of years of
residence. In Model2 we extend this benchmark case by controlling for socio-demographic
factors such as marital status, number of children, disability status, age and its square
as well as the whole set of human capital indicators, i.e. type of secondary education
and type of vocational training and workplace characteristics. Model3 estimates Eq. (9)
correcting for panel attrition. These three models are estimated by pooled OLS (POLS).
In Model 4 we estimate Eq. (2) to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
Finally, Model 5 combines Eqs. (2) and (9) assuming that the bias due to systematic
drop-out of the sample is time-varying. In the latter two models we can only identify the
coe￿cient of the assimilation pro￿le for each sub-group separately and we cannot compare
this pro￿le to German natives. The last two models are therefore a robustness-check for
17The non-reported coe￿cients for the human capital indicators yield the expected signs and they are
all statistically signi￿cant.
20the estimates of the speed of assimilation.
Moving from Model 1 to Model 2 we replicate the important result from the literature
that a large part of the initial earnings di￿erences between foreigners and German natives
can be explained by education and training di￿erences. The only exception is Cohort
6973, but for all other groups the earnings gap decreases by at least20 percentage points.
The most interesting case is the parameter estimates for ethnic Germans. Estimation
results suggest a statistically signi￿cant concave earnings assimilation pro￿le for ethnic
Germans once controlling for education di￿erences. This pro￿le is remarkably robust
across Models 2 to 5. Upon entry to Germany members of this group earn between48
to 64 percent less than German natives18. However, their earnings grow substantially
afterwards. In Model 2, for instance, four years of residence bring ethnic Germans a10
precent increase in annual earnings. The quantitative extent of the initial earnings dif-
ference and catch-up to comparable natives critically depend on the chosen speci￿cation.
The coe￿cient on years of residence decreases continuously from the full speci￿cation
estimated by POLS to the Model with selectivity correction terms with individual ￿xed
e￿ects. Controlling for systematic panel attrition (moving from Model 2 to Model 3)
decreases the initial earnings gap by nearly 16 percentage points. However, the speed of
assimilation as captured by the estimate of the parameter on years of residence, decreases
as well by 3:5 percentage point. The estimated coe￿cient for the quadratic term of years
of residence remains unchanged. Further, controlling for omitted variables (moving from
Model 2 to Model 4) has the same impact on parameter estimates. Only in Model5 in
which we control for both panel attrition and unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity
the parameter estimates of the concave assimilation pro￿le drop by more than50 percent
(Moving from Model 2 to 5)19.
The latest foreign-born immigrant sub-group, Cohort8802 also exhibits a statistically
signi￿cant concave assimilation pro￿le which is more robust across the various models
18In Euro terms that means an ethnic German earns about 16;000 Euros less than a German native
annually in Model 1
19We tested whether the steep assimilation pro￿les of ethnic Germans are driven by individuals with
extreme incomes. Excluding both the top1 and 2 percent of income earners does not change the estimation
results. These results are provided upon request.
21Table 2: Results annual earnings
Benchmark Full Full Full Full
Speci￿cation Speci￿cation Speci￿ccation Speci￿cation Speci￿cation
POLS POLS Heckman correction Fixed E￿ects Heckman & Fix E￿
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
German 10.099¤¤¤ 6.277¤¤¤ 6.311¤¤¤ 6.145¤¤¤ 6.221¤¤¤
(.012) (.097) (.095) (.042) (.041)
IMR participation decision .353¤¤¤ .266¤¤¤
(.014) (.006)
Ethnic German -1.043¤¤¤ -.886¤¤¤ -.728¤¤¤
(.291) (.252) (.240)
Years of residence .092 .152¤¤¤ .117¤¤ .113¤¤¤ .063¤¤¤
(.057) (.052) (.051) (.024) (.024)
Years of residence2 -.002 -.006¤¤ -.005¤ -.005¤¤¤ -.003¤¤
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.001) (.001)
IMR participation decision .467¤¤¤ .392¤¤¤
(.077) (.043)
Entry cohort 1955 to 1968 -.397 -.025 .364
(.473) (.486) (.507)
Years of residence .011 -.006 -.024 -.0009 .001
(.035) (.036) (.038) (.013) (.013)
Years of residence2 .0002 .0003 .0006 -.00002 -.00003
(.0006) (.0006) (.0007) (.0002) (.0002)
IMR participation decision .007 -.015
(.056) (.014)
IMR stay decision .125 .194¤¤¤
(.170) (.045)
Entry cohort 1969 to 1973 -.956¤¤¤ -1.004¤¤¤ -.116
(.214) (.213) (.172)
Years of residence .063¤¤¤ .079¤¤¤ .008 .028¤¤¤ .016¤¤
(.019) (.019) (.016) (.008) (.008)
Years of residence2 -.0007¤ -.001¤¤ .00004 -.0008¤¤¤ -.0004¤¤¤
(.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0002) (.0002)
IMR participation decision .234¤¤¤ .058¤¤¤
(.024) (.010)
IMR stay decision -.440¤¤¤ .132¤¤¤
(.100) (.048)
Entry cohort 1974 to 1987 -.761¤¤ -.050 -.040
(.340) (.186) (.191)
Years of residence .066¤ .022 .020 -.002 -.014¤¤
(.039) (.019) (.019) (.007) (.007)
Years of residence2 -.002 -.0007 -.0007 -.0005¤¤ -.00008
(.001) (.0006) (.0005) (.0002) (.0002)
IMR participation decision .312¤¤¤ .283¤¤¤
(.069) (.020)
IMR stay decision .051 .034
(.073) (.029)
Entry cohort 1988 to 2002 -1.436¤¤¤ -.667¤¤ -.616¤¤
(.285) (.274) (.275)
Years of residence .202¤¤¤ .118¤¤ .102¤ .116¤¤¤ .062¤¤¤
(.062) (.060) (.059) (.019) (.020)
Years of residence2 -.008¤¤ -.005¤ -.004 -.005¤¤¤ -.003¤¤
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.001) (.001)
IMR participation decision .087 .340¤¤¤
(.106) (.040)
IMR stay decision .536¤¤¤ .169¤¤
(.194) (.076)
Number of obs. (N ¢ T) 77879 67095 67095 67095 67095
R2 .035 .437 .47 .282 .316
F statistic 58.651 173.708 167.796 794.709 689.412
Table 2 presents main estimation results on the assimilation pro￿les. IMR = inverse Mills ratio, semi-elasticities for the sub-group dummy
variables are calculated as the di￿erence (¢j) for each sub-group j vis-￿-vis German natives as: ¢j = exp(¯0;j)¡1 (Halvorsen and Palmquist,
1980). White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signi￿cance levels are reported at1 %(¤¤¤), 5 % (¤¤) and 10 % (¤)
22than the one obtained for ethnic Germans. Controlling for the full set of education in
Model 2 leaves this group with yet an initial earnings di￿erence of nearly 50 percent
to comparable German natives. Their earnings also grow with every additional year of
residence, for instance, by 8 percent for four additional years of residence in Germany.
This speed of assimilation is less strong when controlling for selective panel attrition in
Model 3 and 5. Even though there are changes in the estimates for the assimilation pro￿le
when controlling for panel attrition (Moving from Model 2 to Model 3) or unobserved
heterogeneity (Moving from Model2 to Model 4), these are of minor economic importance.
Again, only controlling for both potential biases simultaneously (Moving from Model2
to Model 5) reduces the speed of assimilation substantially by nearly50 percent.
By contrast, we cannot ￿nd a similarly robust picture of assimilation for Cohort6973,
i.e. those individuals who immigrated during the last years of guest-worker recruitment.
For them we observe a statistically signi￿cant concave assimilation pro￿le in the full speci-
￿cation (Model 2), but once controlling for panel attrition (Model3), the concave earnings
pro￿le disappears. Taking into account time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity by indi-
vidual ￿xed e￿ects renders the coe￿cient for years of residence of this group statistically
signi￿cant again. Controlling for selective panel attrition within the ￿xed e￿ects frame-
work does not change this result qualitatively, but it decreases the assimilation coe￿cient
by almost 50 percent. Hence, in our sample the immigrant sub-group Cohort6973 seems
to be highly selected in terms of unobservables.
Both other cohorts, i.e. earlier guest-worker immigrants (Cohort5568) and immigrants
from the family reuni￿cation era (Cohort7487) do not exhibit any systematic assimilation
pro￿le. Especially in the case of Cohort 5568 we identify the assimilation pro￿le mainly
from individuals who have lived for many years in Germany. Thus, these are individuals
who are close to the end of their assimilation process.
Last, the inverse Mills ratios (abrreviated as IMR in Table 2) for the participation
decision are statistically signi￿cant and positive for all groups, except for Cohort5568 and
Cohort 8802 in the POLS speci￿cation. This implies that unobservables that positively
in￿uence the earnings determination process also have a positive impact on the willingness
23to participate in the interview. For all these groups income di￿erences vis-￿-vis German
natives are exaggerated. On the other hand, the underlying links between the decision to
stay and labour market outcomes are more ambiguous among the ￿rst generation cohorts.
Unobservable factors that positively in￿uence the labour market outcomes of Cohort8802
also positively in￿uence the decision to stay. Even though Cohort5568 is also positively
selected in terms of unobservables in the model with individual ￿xed e￿ects (Model5), no
statistical signi￿cant selection is found in Model 3. In contrast, unobservables positively
a￿ecting the labour market performance of Cohort6973, negatively a￿ect the decision to
stay in Model 3. Our results suggest that the highly able members of Cohort 6973 are
more likely to leave Germany. By contrast, in the ￿xed e￿ects speci￿cation of Model5
the highly able immigrants of Cohort 6973 are more likely to stay. One explanation for
the alternating sign could be that the bias due to self-selection is time-varying, and that
underlying factors such as personality traits a￿ect the change of the bias over time.
Figs. 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate the di￿erences in assimilation behaviour of ethnic Ger-
mans, Cohort 8802 and Cohort 6973 for Model 2 and 3, the latter being adjusted for
selective sample drop-out. These pro￿les are constructed for an immigrant who arrived
in Germany at age 25.20.
Whereas both ethnic Germans and members of Cohort5568 catch-up with comparable
German natives after less than 9 years, it takes members of Cohort 6973 nearly 16 years.
Fig. 5(b) illustrates the small changes in assimilation behaviour after adjusting for panel
attrition. The earnings of members of Cohort6973 are not statistically signi￿cant di￿erent
from those of comparable Germans. In contrast, for the two remaining foreigner groups
hardly any changes are visible except for the fact that earnings parity with German natives
takes place more than two years later, if at all for Ethnic Germans.
20We constructed these pro￿les for an individual who obtained ten years of schooling, who holds an
apprenticeship, who is married and has two children, who has been working for the past three years at
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(b) Heckman corrected (Model 3)
Figure 5: Simulated assimilation pro￿les for earnings
4.2 Checks for robustness
Table 3 summarizes the main results of a checks for robustness to our preferred Model 2.
Model S1 imposes the restriction of a homogeneous parameter vector of the assimilation
vector across all foreigner groups. Here we test whether allowing the assimilation path
to di￿er across entry cohorts matters. In Model S2 we exclude all Turkish immigrants
from our sample. The restriction is justi￿ed by the hypothesis that it is mostly Turkish
immigrants that face economic assimilation problems. In Models S3 to S5 we test whether
it is mainly second generation immigrants which are driving the optimistic catch-up rates.
Model S3 complements Model2 with age at immigration as an additional regressor. Model
S4 excludes all individuals who immigrated to Germany at an age younger than15. Model
S5 excludes all immigrants whose potential labour market experience is smaller than their
years of residence in Germany. This ensures that the sample includes only immigrants
who did not undergo vocational training in Germany.
Not discriminating between entry cohorts for ￿rst generation immigrants and ethnic
Germans (Model S1), we obtain an initial earnings di￿erence much smaller than those
obtained for ethnic Germans, Cohort 8802 and Cohort 6973, but much greater than for
Cohort 5568 and Cohort 7487. A formal F-Test imposing parameter homogeneity for
the initial earnings di￿erences in Model 2 can be rejected at the ￿ve percent signi￿cance
25level21. In Fig. 6(a) we can show that catch-up for foreigners as a homogeneous group
would take place after less than 11 years.
Our results by and large do not change by excluding selective foreigner groups from the
sample. Comparing Model 2 with Model S2, in which we exclude the Turkish population
from our sample yields no signi￿cant change to your parameter estimates of interest. Fig.
6(b) shows that catch-up rates remain unchanged. Similar results are obtained when
controlling for the second generation. Age at entry, even though statistically signi￿cant
with a negative sign for all ￿rst generation entry cohorts, plays only a minor economic
importance (Model S3). The only pronounced e￿ect is observed for Cohort 6973, i.e.
the second wave of guest-worker recruitment, whose members experience a2:5 percent
earnings penalty, all other things equal, for each additional year of age at immigration.
Ethnic Germans still exhibit a signi￿cantly concave earnings assimilation pro￿le across
all three models. Initial earnings di￿erences vary within a range of no di￿erence to around
11 percentage points when compared to Model2. The quantitative dimension of the years
of residence coe￿cient for ethnic Germans varies between0:15 and 0:17 and is, thus, only
slightly higher than in Model 2.
A slightly di￿erent picture emerges for Cohort8802. This group still reveals a signi￿-
cantly concave earnings pro￿le in Model S4, which is the sample excluding all immigrants
who were younger than 15 years of age upon entry. Initial earnings di￿erences grow by
up to 15 percentage points in Model S4 and Model S5 vis-￿-vis Model 2, but the speed of
assimilation remains relatively constant across models. Fig. 6(c) exempli￿es this change.
The rapid catch-up rates for Cohort 8802 are mainly driven by the second generation.
This group no longer reaches earnings parity with their native German peer group. For
all other sub-groups the relevant estimates are insigni￿cant and no clear pattern emerges.
21We tested jointly for equality of the cohort intercepts and the quadratic years of residence pro￿les
after estimating the preferred Model 2: F( 4, 10993) = 3.03, Prob > F = 0.0164 testing equality intercept
estimates for foreigners; F( 4, 10993) = 2.42, Prob > F = 0.0465 testing for equality of parameter vector
of years of residence; and F( 4, 10993) = 2.67, Prob > F = 0.0304 for the equality of the parameter vector
of the square of years of residence.
26Table 3: Results annual earnings, sensitivity analysis
Full No cohort Exclude Control for No younger No immigs with
specif distinct Turkish age at entry than 15 at entry training in GER
Model 2 Model S1 Model S2 Model S3 Model S4 Model S5
Immigrant -.246¤¤¤
(.082)
Years of residence .025¤¤¤
(.007)
Years of residence2 -.0004¤¤
(.0002)
German 6.275¤¤¤ 6.255¤¤¤ 6.207¤¤¤ 6.332¤¤¤ 6.433¤¤¤ 6.408¤¤¤
(.097) (.108) (.111) (.098) (.100) (.100)
Ethnic German -1.043¤¤¤ -1.040¤¤¤ -.877¤¤¤ -.930¤¤¤ -.941¤¤¤
(.252) (.302) (.269) (.250) (.253)
Years of residence .152¤¤¤ .163¤¤¤ .151¤¤¤ .166¤¤¤ .172¤¤¤
(.052) (.055) (.054) (.053) (.053)
Years of residence2 -.006¤¤ -.006¤¤ -.006¤¤ -.007¤¤¤ -.008¤¤¤
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Age at entry to Germany -.002
(.004)
Entry cohort 1955 to 1968 -.025 .066 .054 .199 .264
(.486) (.615) (.625) (.266) (.279)
Years of residence -.006 -.016 -.002 -.033 ¤ -.038¤
(.036) (.044) (.036) (.018) (.020)
Years of residence2 .0003 .0001 .0002 .0009¤¤¤ .0009¤¤¤
(.0006) (.001) (.0006) (.0003) (.0003)
Age at entry to Germany -.008¤¤
(.004)
Entry cohort 1969 to 1973 -1.004¤¤¤ -1.030¤¤¤ .126 .043 .026
(.213) (.336) (.256) (.189) (.196)
Years of residence .079¤¤¤ .090¤¤¤ .034¤ -.017 -.017
(.019) (.028) (.018) (.018) (.019)
Years of residence2 -.001¤¤ .001¤¤ -.0005 .0006 .0006
(.0004) (.0005) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
Age at entry to Germany -.026¤¤¤
(.003)
Entry cohort 1974 to 1987 -.050 -.225 .140 -.115 -.075
(.186) (.295) (.151) (.184) (.198)
Years of residence .022 .036 .016 .022 .004
(.019) (.033) (.017) (.020) (.021)
Years of residence2 -.0007 -.001 -.0007 -.0007 .00004
(.0006) (.001) (.0005) (.0006) (.0007)
Age at entry to Germany -.008¤
(.005)
Entry cohort 1988 to 2002 -.667¤¤ -.668¤ -.517 -.825¤¤¤ -.807¤¤¤
(.274) (.393) (.394) (.288) (.288)
Years of residence .118¤¤ .114 .124¤¤ .143¤¤ .123¤¤
(.060) (.088) (.060) (.063) (.062)
Years of residence2 -.005¤ -.006 -.005¤ -.006¤¤ -.005
(.003) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Age at entry to Germany -.010
(.007)
R2 .437 0.374 0.3936 .441 .430 .431
F statistic 173.708 244.61 162.93 160.04 154.17 152.80
Table 3 reports the results on the robustness checks applied to the preferred model (earnings equation controlling for all socio-demographic variables
including human capital indicators). Model S1 imposes homogeneous parameter vectors on assimilation pro￿les, Model S2 excludes all Turkish
immigrants from the sample, Model S3 includes "age at immigration" as additional regressor, Model S4 restricts the sample to only those foreigners
who arrived in Germany at age 15 years or older, and Model S5 excludes all foreigners who went, at least partly, through the German education
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(c) Exclude second generation (Model S 5)
Figure 6: Simulated assimilation pro￿les, robustness checks
5 Conclusions
This paper investigates labour market outcomes in terms of annual gross real earnings of
immigrants relative to comparable German natives. Rich and high quality data of the
German Socio-Economic Panel are utilized to test for heterogeneous assimilation pro￿les
across four entry cohorts of ￿rst generation immigrants and ethnic Germans. We test
whether the estimates of the assimilation pro￿les are driven by potential di￿erences in
unobserved productivity or human capital investments that determine the shape of the
assimilation path between groups. In addition, we investigate the role of panel attrition in
shaping the estimation results. Systematic exit from the sample is corrected in a two-step
sample selection correction that models jointly the decision to participate in the interview
28and the decision to stay in Germany (Heckman, 1979).
We ￿nd heterogeneity in the assimilation pro￿les across the ￿ve identi￿ed groups.
With respect to annual earnings, ethnic Germans and the youngest group of foreign im-
migrants, both who arrived between1988 and 2002, exhibit similar statistically signi￿cant
concave assimilation pro￿les. Both groups su￿er an initial disadvantage vis-￿-vis compa-
rable German natives of nearly 50 percent, whereas their earnings grow at a decreasing
rate over time, making up approximately ten percent for each additional four years of stay
in Germany. These initial earnings di￿erences are greater than those found in Schmidt
(1992) for guest-workers who predicts an initial disadvantage of earnings of twelve percent
and an average increase of 0.7 percent for each additional year of residence. This indi-
cates that more recent immigrants and ethnic Germans perform worse upon arrival, but
assimilate reasonably well to the German labour market if they ￿nd employment. The es-
timated catch-up rates of both groups of less than nine years are also in-line with ￿ndings
for US data (Chiswick, 1978; Carliner, 1980). For the foreigner group which arrived be-
tween 1969 and 1973, we ￿nd a ￿atter assimilation pro￿le. Catch-up for this group occurs
after 16 years, an estimate which resembles the results of Schmidt (1993) and Constant
and Massey (2005). We cannot con￿rm the assimilation hypothesis for immigrants who
arrived between 1955 and 1968 and between 1974 and 1987. Our estimates show neither
statistically signi￿cant initial di￿erences nor earnings growth rates in comparison to Ger-
man natives. This might be due to the fact that we do not observe earnings di￿erences
upon entry from 1955 onwards for these cohorts, but rather upon sample entry since1984.
Thus, assimilation pro￿les are mainly identi￿ed with data points collected late along the
assimilation path for Cohort 5568.
Our results further suggest that omitted variable and attrition bias play a minor
quantitative role in these outcomes. Only for Cohort6973 we ￿nd substantial di￿erences,
indicating that this group is highly self-selected. Unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity
slightly biases the estimated assimilation pro￿les upwards. Nevertheless, controlling for
this bias with ￿xed e￿ects estimation still yields statistically signi￿cant coe￿cients on
earnings growth. Regarding selective panel attrition, we ￿nd that for most foreigner sub-
29groups and German natives alike unobservable factors that a￿ect earnings positively, also
impinge positively upon the decision to participate in the interview. Hence, individuals
who perform relatively well in the labour market are also more likely to stay in the sample.
This result on foreigners is in line with results provided by Rendtel (1995) for the general
population and the general literature on return-migration for Germany (Brecht, 1994;
Constant and Massey, 2005; Velling, 1994; Schmidt, 1994a). Controlling for attrition bias
leaves earnings di￿erences of ethnic Germans and Cohort8802 vis-￿-vis German natives
less pronounced and assimilation pro￿les ￿atten out, even though the estimates are still
signi￿cant. Only for Cohort 6973 systematic drop out from the sample seems to drive
assimilation pro￿les. Taken together, our results correspond with the empirical literature
on panel attrition (e.g. Behr (2004) or Behr et al. (2003)) suggesting that labour market
related attrition is present, but does not necessarily alter conclusions.
Imposing a homogeneous parameter vector on the assimilation pro￿le is rejected by
conventional F-tests. Looking at the assimilation path, we ￿nd nevertheless that a homo-
geneous group of foreigners su￿ers an initial earnings di￿erence of approximately twenty
percent, but earnings parity with comparable German natives would be reached after
eleven years. Excluding the quasi-second generation immigrants from our sample changes
results only slightly for Cohort 8802. This entry cohort no longer reaches earnings parity
with German natives. This suggests that for individuals from this group who arrived in
Germany before the age of 14 or who obtained some vocational training in Germany per-
form relatively well economically. Last, we cannot ￿nd that Turkish immigrants perform
signi￿cantly di￿erent from their immigrant peers, as excluding them from all foreigner
sub-samples does not change estimation results.
Overall, we conclude that both observable and unobservable heterogeneity plays a
signi￿cant role in assessing labour market outcomes of individuals with di￿erent cultural
backgrounds. A separate analysis of the second generation could be of interest to complete
the picture of heterogeneous assimilation behaviour.
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34Table 4: Description of variables
Variable Name Description
Assimilation Variables
Ethnic German Intercept Dummy which takes the value1 if the individual belongs to the
group of ethnic Germans and 0 otherwise
Cohort 5568 Intercept dummy which takes the value 1 if the individual belongs to
the group of First Generation Immigrant, Cohort5568 and 0 otherwise
Cohort 6973 Intercept dummy which takes the value 1 if the individual belongs to the
group of ￿rst generation immigrant, Cohort6973 and 0 otherwise
Cohort 7487 Intercept dummy which takes the value 1 if the individual belongs to the
group of ￿rst generation immigrant, Cohort7487 and 0 otherwise
Cohort 8802 Intercept dummy which takes the value 1 if the individual belongs to the
group of ￿rst generation immigrant, Cohort8802 and 0 otherwise
Yrsres Years of residence calculated as the di￿erence between the year
in time period t and the year of immigration
Yrsres Eth Ger Interaction term of rears of residence and dummy ethnic German
Yrsres Cohort 5568 Interaction term of rears of residence and dummy Cohort5568
Yrsres Cohort 6973 Interaction term of rears of residence and dummy Cohort6973
Yrsres Cohort 7487 Interaction term of rears of residence and dummy Cohort7487
Yrsres Cohort 8802 Interaction term of rears of residence and dummy Cohort8802
Yrsres2 The Square of Years of Residence calculated as the square of the di￿erence
between the year of current time period t and the year of immigration
Yrsres2 Eth Ger Interaction term of Years of Residence Squared and Dummy Ethnic German
Yrsres2 Cohort 5568 Interaction term of Years of Residence Squared and Dummy Cohort5568
Yrsres2 Cohort 6973 Interaction term of Years of Residence Squared and Dummy Cohort6973
Yrsres2 Cohort 7487 Interaction term of Years of Residence Squared and Dummy Cohort7487
Yrsres2 Cohort 8802 Interaction term of Years of Residence Squared and Dummy Cohort8802
Set of Education Dummies
Dropout Dummy which takes the value 1 if the individual dropped out of high school
and 0 otherwise
Secondary Dummy which takes the value1 if the individual passed compulsory schooling
of nine years of high school (Hauptschule) and0 otherwise
Intermediary Dummy which takes the value1 if the individual received ten years of
high school (Realschule) and 0 otherwise
Upper Dummy which takes the value 1 if the individual received thirteen years of
high school (Gymnasium) and 0 otherwise
35Table 5: Description of Variables, continued
Variable Name Description
Set of Professional Education Dummies
No training Dummy which takes the value1 if the individual did not acquire any
professional training, 0 otherwise
Training Dummy which takes the value 1 if the individual ￿nished an apprenticeship or
vocational school of any profession (Lehre) ,0 otherwise
Technocrat Dummy which takes the value1 if the individual obtained a degree of a
health care, technical or civil service training (Fachhochschule) ,0 otherwise
Uniedu Dummy which takes the value 1 if the individual received a degree from a
technical college or a university , 0 otherwise
Othschool Dummy which takes the value1 if the individual received any other education
which is left unspeci￿ed , 0 otherwise
Socio-Demographic Charact.
Age Continuous variable that measures the current age of an individual
Age2 Continuous variable that measures the square of age
Mar1 Dummy which takes the value 1 if the individual is married , 0 otherwise
Mar2 Dummy which takes the value 1 if the individual is married but lives separated
from the partner , 0 otherwise
Mar3 Dummy which takes the value 1 if the individual is single , 0 otherwise
Mar4 Dummy which takes the value 1 if the individual is divorced , 0 otherwise
Mar5 Dummy which takes the value 1 if the individual is widowed , 0 otherwise
Disable Dummy which takes the value 1 if the individual is registered as being
disabled of any degree , 0 otherwise
Pershh Number of persons living in the household
Working Life Charact.
Workhrs Continuous variable that measures the average weekly hours spent at work
Ten Continuous variable that measures the number of years an individual
spent at the ￿rm currently working
36Table 6: Description of Variables, continued
Variable Name Description
IV Participation Decision
Change Change of Interviewer: This variable takes the value1
if the interviewer changed for the individual after the ￿rst interview
IV Non-Return Migration Decision
Child13 Number of children in household which are younger than13 years of age
Child Away Dummy variable that takes the value1 if the individual’s
children are living in home country
Spouse Away Dummy variable that takes the value1 if the individual’s spouse lives abroad
War/Freedom Dummy variable that takes the value1 if the individual’s motivation to migrate
to Germany was either to escape war or to search for political freedom
37Table 7: Results of reduced form probit for decision to stay
Cohort 55 to 68 Cohort 69 to 73 Cohort 74 to 87 Cohort 8802
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No. child. < 13 (IV) .246¤¤¤
(.063)
Child away (IV) .548¤¤¤
(.180)
Spouse away (IV) -1.029¤¤
(.440)
War or freedom (IV) .450¤
(.271)
Age .359¤¤¤ .088¤¤ -.061 -.083
(.047) (.035) (.043) (.071)
Age2 -.004¤¤¤ -.001¤¤¤ .001¤ .001
(.0005) (.0004) (.0006) (.0009)
Workhrs per week .006 .003 -.009 -.014¤
(.004) (.005) (.007) (.008)
Tenure in ￿rm (Yrs.) .019¤¤¤ .015¤¤ .023¤¤¤ -.063¤¤
(.005) (.006) (.009) (.030)
Intermediate (10 Yrs.) .842¤¤ -.053 4.909¤¤¤ 4.934¤¤¤
(.338) (.238) (.166) (.178)
Technical (10 to 12 Yrs.) 4.799¤¤¤ -1.227¤¤¤
(.221) (.297)
Upper (13 Yrs.) .031 4.667¤¤¤ .101 -1.517¤¤¤
(.388) (.213) (.261) (.377)
Other -.792¤¤¤ -.868¤¤¤ -.975¤¤¤ -.565¤¤¤
(.148) (.199) (.124) (.213)
Dropout -1.046¤¤¤ -.729¤¤¤ -1.120¤¤¤ -1.161¤¤¤
(.167) (.203) (.161) (.373)
University degree -.263 -.398 .132 -.201
(.271) (.257) (.215) (.280)
No prof. training -.546¤¤¤ -1.020¤¤¤ .521¤¤¤ -.155
(.142) (.211) (.150) (.281)
Technocrat raining -.474¤¤¤ -.977¤¤¤ .420¤¤¤ -.595¤¤
(.154) (.216) (.138) (.267)
Separated 1.072¤¤¤ -.420 -.453 6.321¤¤¤
(.287) (.370) (.336) (.255)
Single .430¤¤¤ -.138 .631¤¤¤ -.324
(.157) (.206) (.133) (.264)
Divorced .959¤¤¤ -.045 1.198¤¤¤ 6.671¤¤¤
(.225) (.223) (.231) (.403)
Person in HH (No.) .036 .119¤¤¤ .211¤¤¤ -.035
(.039) (.037) (.036) (.061)
Const. -6.134¤¤¤ 1.137 2.210¤¤¤ 4.174¤¤¤
(1.060) (.871) (.837) (1.304)
Obs. (N*T) 2869 5304 3007 855
Table 7 reports coe￿cients of a binary probit model that regresses the observation of not moving out of Germany
on a set of regressors and instrumental variables (IV). Instruments used are the number of children below the age of
13 (No. child. < 13), Child away, Spouse away, and war or freedom. (N*T) = Number of person-year observations.
Signi￿cance levels are reported at 1 %(¤¤¤), 5 % (¤¤) and 10 % (¤).
38Table 8: Results of reduced form probit for decision to participate
GER ETH GER C 5568 C 6973 C 7487 C 8802
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change of interviewer (IV) -.412¤¤¤ -.554¤¤¤ -.550¤¤¤ -.487¤¤¤ -.838¤¤¤ -.541¤¤¤
(.020) (.215) (.117) (.087) (.108) (.184)
Age -.002 -.057 -.023 .234¤¤¤ -.033 .068
(.006) (.043) (.054) (.045) (.034) (.054)
Age2 .0001¤ .0006 .0007 -.002¤¤¤ .0006 -.0006
(.00007) (.0005) (.0006) (.0005) (.0005) (.0007)
Workhrs per week -.003¤¤¤ -.005 -.012¤¤¤ .023¤¤¤ .008 -.001
(.0009) (.007) (.005) (.004) (.005) (.006)
Tenure in ￿rm (Yrs.) .003¤¤ .024 .015¤¤¤ .009¤ .011 .010
(.001) (.016) (.005) (.005) (.009) (.021)
Intermediate (10 Yrs.) .009 .230 -3.123¤¤¤ 1.296¤¤¤ .114 -.026
(.021) (.165) (.301) (.309) (.156) (.349)
Technical (10 to 12 Yrs.) .074¤¤ -.380
(.037) (.346)
Upper (13 Yrs.) .160¤¤¤ -.278 -.691¤ .664¤¤¤ .747¤¤¤ -.139
(.032) (.232) (.353) (.254) (.205) (.385)
Other .017 .391¤¤¤ -.169 .583¤¤¤ -.083 -.234
(.093) (.134) (.189) (.166) (.104) (.241)
Dropout .122¤ .639 .384¤¤ .534¤¤¤ -.355¤¤¤ -.010
(.069) (.501) (.184) (.166) (.125) (.324)
University degree -.164¤¤¤ .356¤¤ -.802¤¤ .038 -.556¤¤¤ -.319
(.032) (.164) (.322) (.194) (.176) (.246)
No prof. training -.099¤¤¤ -.018 -.769¤¤¤ .339¤¤ -.049 -.315
(.030) (.145) (.178) (.154) (.100) (.220)
Technocrat Training -.069¤¤¤ -.019 -.557¤¤¤ .328¤¤ .064 .006
(.021) (.131) (.192) (.155) (.147) (.236)
Separated -.117 -.930¤ .781¤¤ -.104 -.008 -1.413¤¤¤
(.073) (.490) (.356) (.244) (.325) (.413)
Single -.091¤¤¤ -.047 1.409¤¤¤ 2.103¤¤¤ -.050 -.653¤¤¤
(.025) (.176) (.190) (.243) (.115) (.223)
Divorced -.144¤¤¤ -1.260¤¤¤ .273 1.109¤¤¤ -.184 -.982¤¤¤
(.037) (.310) (.182) (.220) (.177) (.284)
Person in HH (No.) .040¤¤¤ .026 .136¤¤¤ .267¤¤¤ .112¤¤¤ .192¤¤¤
(.007) (.025) (.030) (.030) (.021) (.051)
Const. -.051 1.362 -.331 -9.680¤¤¤ -.298 -1.227
(.126) (.835) (1.200) (1.192) (.625) (1.004)
Obs. (N*T) 44864 1162 2869 5265 2942 855
Table 8 reports coe￿cients of a binary probit model that regresses the observation of participating in the interview
on a set of regressors and instrumental variables (IV) lagged by one time period. Instrument used is the change of
interviewer after the ￿rst year participating. GER = German, ETH GER = ethnic German, C5568 = Cohort 5568,
C 6973 = Cohort 6973, and so on, (N*T) = Number of person-year observations. Signi￿cance levels are reported at1
%(¤¤¤), 5 % (¤¤) and 10 % (¤).
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